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The present paper first examines Stephen D. Krasner ’s analysis of state sovereignty and 
some criticisms raised against it. The examination shows that the issue of change versus 
continuity lies at the bottom of the opposition between Krasner and his critics. The 
opposition can be generalized into that between the mainstream international relations 
theorists and its critics, especially constructivism, because the former assumes that the 
international system is unchanged. The opposition boils down to the difference in the 
time span. 
The mainstream theory also assumes that state, the unit of the international 
system is unitary, thus excluding important actors and factors of domestic politics from 
international relations. This assumption is again severely criticized. Helen V. Milner 
proposes an extension of the mainstream theory to include domestic politics, on the 
basis of the criticism of the limit of the theory. This paper examines her proposal as an 
example of the criticism. It shows that the necessity of the inclusion or exclusion of 
domestic actors or domestic politics depends upon the particular research objective 
which a researcher pursues, and that the debates about the inclusion of domestic politics 
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are reduced to the difference in the level of abstraction or aggregation which a theory 
aims at. 
Thus the differences between the mainstream theorists and their critics amount 
to those in the time frame and the scope of variables. In other words, the difference in 
the level of abstraction or aggregation lies at the root of their differences.  
To be sure, this paper ends up with a cliché, which tells us only that the 
appropriate level of abstraction or aggregation depends crucially on a particular theme 
or research agenda. But, it does tell us that, in an international relations theory, we must 
yet to decide which level of abstraction is suitable for what research purpose. A clear 
understanding of this will be much more fruitful than the mere exchange of criticisms 
and counter-criticisms. 
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Introduction 
1  Stephen D. Krasner’s Analyses of State Sovereignty 
2  Criticism by Steve Smith 
3  Change vs. Continuity of Norms and Rules 
4  Beyond State-centrism 





Modern international society is said to have originated in the Peace of Westphalia in 
1648, which ended the Thirty Years War, and it is essentially a society of sovereign 
states (Krasner 1996: 115).1 Without the central authority regulating the relations among 
states, the norm of state sovereignty has been one of the key princip le regulating the 
anarchical society of states. Taken for granted for a long time, it had received scant 
attention from international relations scholars. Recently, however, more and more 
international relations theorists have been casting doubt upon, and begun to critically 
reexamine, the concept of state sovereignty (Biersteker and Weber 1996:1). For 
example, special issues of such journals as International Studies Review (vol. 2, no. 1, 
summer, 2000) and International Relations of the Asia-Pacific (Japan Association of 
International Relations) (vol.1, no. 2, 2001) also reflect the increased critical interest in 
the concept of state sovereignty. The recent increase (or should we say “vogue”) is 
perhaps due to the alleged decline of the state sovereignty. There are many events which 
seem to indicates the decline of state sovereignty. Humanitarian interventions such as 
the Kosovo campaign seem to undermine the sovereignty of the state intervened. Many 
states, especially so-called failed states, seem to be unable to exercise their sovereignty 
within their own territories, due primarily to internal armed conflicts. The irresistible 
trend of globalization seems to sweep easily away the sovereignty of many weaker 
states. The member states of the European Union seem to have been voluntarily giving 
up part of their sovereignty. All these can be viewed as indicative of the decline of state 
sovereignty. 2 
There are, however, those who are not convinced of the decline of state 
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sovereignty. For example, Stephen D. Krasner seems to have been skeptical about the 
(arguments about) decline of state sovereignty. His stance toward the impact of 
globalization on state sovereignty is close to that of the “skeptics” (Smith 2001: 214). 
For example, in a joint article with Janice E. Thomson, Krasner criticizes the 
interdependence arguments that globalization, especially the dramatic increase of 
transborder flows of all kinds, that is, capital, information, goods, and people, has 
eroded the effective state control over them, and hence the state’s sovereignty. Thomson 
and Krasner counter the interdependence arguments of the decline of state sovereignty 
by pointing out that “[a]t least in part [the increase in international economic 
transactions] must be attributed to the consolidation of sovereignty,” because “the 
consolidation of sovereignty has facilitated the creation of stable property rights that is a 
necessary if not sufficient condition for a market-rational allocation of resources,” and 
thus, “the consolidation of the state system has facilitated, indeed made possible” 
globalization today (Thomson and Krasner 1989: 216, italics mine). Moreover, they 
argue, state control over the use of violence in the international system has become 
substantially greater (Thomson and Krasner 1989: 208). 
The present paper does not aim to answer the question of whether state 
sovereignty has been declining or not. Nor does it attempt at the clarification or 
elaboration of the concept of state sovereignty. Instead, it aims to clarify the nature of 
certain assumptions in international relations theory, with Krasner ’s recent analyses of 
state sovereignty as a starting point.  
In the first section, we will examine Krasner’s understanding of the concept of 
sovereignty in some detail to lay a necessary foundation for the subsequent discussion. 
Though his book, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, should be the first material in such 
an attempt, we will base our discussion on several recent articles by Krasner himself 
and criticisms of them. In the next section, we will examine some of the (mainly 
constructivist) criticisms against Krasner’s analysis of state sovereignty, especially those 
raised by Steve Smith. The examination in the two sections will make clear that one 
important issue is whether international norms or rules are changing or not. Accordingly, 
the third section will be devoted to the examination of the issue of change versus 
continuity and its implication for international relations theory. The examination in this 
section will show that the continuity or unchangedness is a key assumption of the 
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mainstream international relations theory. The next section, the fourth section, will 
introduce another key assumption, “the state-centeredness” assumption, of the 
mainstream model of international relations, and examine Helen Milner’s proposal for 
the relaxation of the assumption. In conclusion, the last section will show that even 
critics of the mainstream model face the same dilemma as mainstream theorists whom 
they criticize, and that the real issue is a serious trade-off between theoretical parsimony 
and explanatory and historical richness. 
 
1 Stephen D. Krasner’s Analyses of State Sovereignty 
 
One can be skeptical of the idea of the decline of state sovereignty in two ways at least. 
First, as Krasner often did, one can point to the fact that “there has been no golden age 
[of state sovereignty] in which Machiavelli’s Prince could take a nap secure in the 
knowledge that external and internal challenges have disappeared” (Thomson and 
Krasner 1989: 198). The Westphalian model of state sovereignty has never been more 
than a reference point or a convention, or an idealized system of political authority 
(Krasner 1996: 115). Then, how can one speak of the decline when something has never 
reached a sufficient height from which to decline? Those who assert or predict the 
decline or erosion of state sovereignty are only “creating an imaginary past” (Smith 
2001: 211) of the golden age of sovereignty. Second, as Krasner sometimes did, one can 
point to the consolidation of state sovereignty in some issue areas at least, such as 
military and security areas, while it may decline in others. In the articles examined here, 
Krasner basically adopts the first way. Let us briefly trace the development of his 
thought. 
In his 1996 article, Krasner states that “the Westphalian model has never been 
an accurate description of states and a system composed of them,” (Krasner 1996: 115) 
and the principle of sovereignty has been “frequently defeated” (Krasner 1996: 144). 
Moreover, its breaches have been an enduring characteristics of the international system 
(Krasner 1996: 115). Indeed, it seems to have been honored in the breach. This is the 
starting point of Krasner’s discussion of state sovereignty. He adduces numerous current 
and historical cases of compromise and violation of the state sovereignty principle with 
the typology of their modalities. Nevertheless, the Westphalian model, especially the 
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principle of state sovereignty, has persisted for a long time even up to now (Krasner 
1996: 144). Violations of the principle, as well as the principle itself, have been 
enduring characteristics of international relations. Therefore, violations of the 
sovereignty principle cannot be understood as a reflection of a breakdown of the 
principle (Krasner 1996: 147). Now the problem is how to explain the violation and 
persistence of state sovereignty. Krasner hints at an explanation in the last pages of the 
1996 article, arguing that “it would be more productive to stop thinking of the 
Westphalian model as some ideal or historical reality and to treat it as a reference point 
or convention that is useful in some circumstances” (Krasner 1996: 150, italics mine). 
His subsequent works are efforts to solve this puzzle of “weakness and persistence” 
(Krasner 1996: 144). 
“Organized hypocrisy” is the answer Krasner gives to this puzzle. He argues 
that “more than any other setting, international environment is characterized by 
organized hypocrisy. Actors violate rules in practice without at the same time 
challenging their legitimacy” (Krasner 2001c: 173, italics mine). To show that 
organized hypocrisy was frequently resorted to, that is, to show that the principle of 
sovereignty was often violated while rhetorically embraced, Krasner first identified two 
kinds of logic which guide state behaviors: logic of consequences and logic of 
appropriateness. Logic of consequences sees political action and outcomes as the 
product of rational calculating behavior designed to maximize a given set of 
unexplained preferences. Logic of appropriateness understands political action as a 
product of rules, roles and identities. Identities specify appropriate behavior in given 
situations (Krasner 2001c: 175-176). In general, logic of consequences dictated 
behavior while logic of appropriateness was rhetorically embraced. Organized 
hypocrisy was rife (Krasner 2001c: 174). In other words, interests and material concerns 
dominate norms and rules (Inoguchi and Bacon 2001a: 168). This is one of the points 
criticized by Smith, whose criticism will be taken up in the next section. 
In order to show that organized hypocrisy has been an enduring characteristic 
of the international system, Krasner then proceeds to “unbundle” (Krasner 2001a: 6) the 
concept of sovereignty into four main usages: interdependence sovereignty, domestic 
sovereignty, international legal sovereignty, and Westphalian sovereignty (Krasner 
2001a: 2). Interdependence sovereignty refers to the ability of a government to regulate 
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the movement of goods, capital, people, and ideas across its borders. Domestic 
sovereignty refers both to the structure of authority within a state and to the state’s 
effectiveness or control. International legal sovereignty refers to whether a state is 
recognized by others, the basic rule being that only juridically independent territorial 
entities are accorded recognition. Westphalian sovereignty, which actually has almost 
nothing to do with the Peace of Westphalia, refers to the autonomy of domestic 
authority structures – that is, the absence of authoritative external influence. A political 
entity can be formally independent but de facto deeply penetrated. And having one 
attribute of sovereignty does not necessarily mean having others (Krasner 2001a: 2, 
6-7).  
In his 1996 article, focusing on the last of these, that is, the Westphalian 
sovereignty, Krasner shows convincingly that the norms and rules of the Westphalian 
sovereignty were frequently violated or compromised. He makes similar efforts in his 
later works, but the emphasis seems to shift from organized hypocrisy and the 
dominance of the logic of consequences over the logic of appropriateness to a more 
nuanced view of the relationship between the two types of logic. While he still 
emphasizes the violation of the norms and rules of the Westphalian sovereignty, he also 
admits that “the rules associated with sovereignty appear to have powerfully constrained 
the options that are available to actors” (Krasner 2001a: 3). Indeed, now that he has 
established his thesis of organized hypocrisy and the dominance of the logic of 
consequences, Krasner embarks upon the exploration of the relationship of the two 
types of logic. 
In explaining the relationship of the two kinds of logic, Krasner employs three 
variables, ideas, power and interests, each respectively representing constructivist, 
neorealist and neoliberalist schools of international relations. The variables roughly 
correspond to the three categories of outcomes which Krasner calls “defaults, coercion 
and voluntary commitment,” respectively (Krasner 2001b: 323-324).  
First of all, unless other arrangements are viable, the conventional rules of 
sovereignty are a default. Ideas do matter and shape the conception that actors have of 
their own interests. But, in other cases, more powerful states may use coercion to 
impose an alternative institutional arrangement on weaker states if the more powerful 
decide that the benefits of coercion outweigh the costs. Even in these cases, ideas are 
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not irrelevant, but power determines outcomes. Thirdly, if rulers can make voluntary 
commitments, that is, create an equilibrium outcomes from which no critical player has 
an incentive to defect either through unilateral initiatives or by contracting with other 
states, then anything is possible. As the conventional understanding of sovereignty 
provided by international lawyers suggests, no contractual arrangements between states 
is illicit, and hence does not impinge upon state sovereignty. States are free to do 
whatever they choose. In these situations interests trump ideas (Krasner 2001b: 324). 
In sum, absent voluntary action or coercion, sovereignty was the default 
(Krasener 2001a: 20-21, Krasner 2001b: 329). In other words, conventional rules of 
sovereignty are a default if leaders cannot voluntarily agree to, or use coercion to 
impose, alternatives. To note that conventional rules are a default acknowledges that 
they are constraining but does not imply that they are determinative. The rules of 
sovereignty, like the rules that have existed in any international environment, do matter, 
especially if political leaders cannot agree, or use coercion, to create alternatives. 
Prevailing rules make it easier to do some things and harder to do others. But they are 
not determinative (Krasner 2001b: 341-342). 
Krasner ’s argument about state sovereignty can be summarized in two points. 
First, norms and rules of state sovereignty were a default when coercion or voluntary 
contractual commitment was not viable. But when coercion or voluntary commitment 
was available, the principle was honored in the breach. Secondly, therefore, it can be 
concluded that the logic of consequences dominates the logic of appropriateness as far 
as international practices of sovereignty was concerned or that interests surpass norms 
in international politics, contrary to the arguments of some constructivists. As we will 
see later, this is another point criticized by Smith. 
 
2 Criticism by Steve Smith 
 
Steve Smith’s constructivist criticism of Krasner ’s thesis can be summarized in two 
points. The first criticism is against Krasner’s view that the logic of consequences 
dominates the logic of appropriateness. The second is against the view that the rules of 
sovereignty are unchanged. We will discuss them in this order. 
Smith argues that norms and rules shape behavior in two ways; first by 
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constituting the identities of state actors, and secondly by constraining action due to the 
awareness of the existence of powerful global norms (Smith 2001: 209). Norms and 
rules, and practices both affect the identity of the actor, and constrain what is deemed 
possible (Smith 2001: 210-211). Thus, “the state, … and sovereignty are best seen as 
constructed and reinforced by practices” (Smith 2001: 224). Generally speaking, we can 
all agree with this kind of constructivist argument. Smith seems to say that norms and 
rules shape the identity (and interests) of the state actor and constrains the behavior. 
Thus, the logic of appropriateness, which emphasizes rules and norms, is “a far better 
guide to the emerging patterns of governance and sovereignty than is the logic of 
consequences” (Smith 2001: 224). It is because the logic of appropriateness (rules and 
norms) shapes and constrains identities, interests and behavior of state actors.  
To be sure, Smith does not provide any explanation or formulation about how 
norms and rules, especially those of state sovereignty, are constructed. It is also true of 
some constructivists when they assert, for example, that “practices of states and 
nonstate agents produce, reform, and redefine sovereignty” (Biersteker and Weber 1996: 
11). Though this is an important issue, we will not discuss it here. Instead, we proceed 
to the two problems of Smith’s criticism. First, even if we agree with Smith upon the 
importance of norms and rules (and Krasner himself admits that they do matter, as we 
saw above), it does not mean that norms and rules are always more important than 
material interests, nor does it mean that norms and rules are more important in 
explaining or understanding state sovereignty practices. If, as he says, “the extent to 
which social practices are ideationally or materially based” or “the extent to which 
norms reflect interests or constitute identities” (Smith 2001: 207) is to be determined, it 
is a matter of empirical research in a particular context.  
The second problem concerns the degree of latitude of norms and rules. Even if 
we admit that norms and rules shape and constrain behavior and action, they don’t 
completely determine behavior and action, as Smith himself admits that “[states may] 
stretch the norms and indeed push them in new directions” (Smith 2001: 210). Then the 
question is how much latitude norms and rules allow. There must be a threshold beyond 
which the norms and the rules in question should be regarded as changed, discarded or 
obsolete. How much or how often can states deviate from rules and norms? As we saw 
above, Krasner tries to answer this question, by giving two variables: interests and the 
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capability of voluntary agreement or coercion (Krasner 2001b: 341-342)., while Smith 
says nothing. 
Thus, the first criticism by Smith does not offer any strong counter-argument 
against Krasner’s thesis which we examined above. So, let us now examine the second 
criticism Smith raised against Krasner. The crux of Smith’s argument is that while 
Krasner assumes that sovereignty (rule) is not changed, globalization has been 
transforming sovereignty. According to Smith, “[the] effects [of globalization] impact 
on governance to such an extent that they result in the construction of new constitutive 
rules and norms. These, in turn, alter both the identity of states, and constrain their 
behavior, thereby affecting their sovereignty…” (Smith 2001: 212). This argument is 
quite similar to those of so-called “tansformationalists.” For example, Susan Strange, 
whom Smith strangely enough classifies into “hyperglobalizers,”3 that is, those who 
portray the state as being swept away by the rise of a single global market (Smith 2001: 
212-213), also argues that structural changes brought about by globalization have been 
changing the role of states both within national societies and between them, and altering 
them very substantially (Strange 1994: 212-213). But the problem with these 
“transformationalists” is that they are not very clear about how, in which area(s) or 
function(s), and to what degree, globalization is transforming state or state sovereignty. 
Probably no one can deny that globalization has been affecting state sovereignty to 
some degree or in some respect. The issue here is, partially at least, whether or not we 
can or must call it change and transformation. We will, therefore, take up the issue of 
change and continuity in the next section. 
 
3 Change vs. Continuity of Norms and Rules 
 
We have examined Krasner’s analyses of state sovereignty and Smith’s criticism against 
them in some detail. It was because, with Krasner and Smith as input, we want to raise 
two interesting but difficult issues. The first is the issue of change and continuity of the 
international system and of norms and rules. The second is the issue of the theoretical 
framework or paradigm within which sovereignty is to be discussed.  
Whether Krasner is a so-called neorealist or neoliberalist is not important to us, 
but he is often regarded as a neorealist in the broader sense of the word and as a 
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representative of the North American mainstream of international relations.4 The 
theoretical foundation of “neorealism” can be represented by Kenneth Waltz. As John 
Gerald Ruggie forcefully argues in his review of Waltz’s Theory of International 
Politics, Waltz’s model of international system lacks both the dimension of change, and 
the determinant of the change, of the international system, by “[exogenizing] the 
ultimate source of systemic change” (Ruggie 1983: 281, 285). As a result, Waltz’s 
theory contains only “a reproductive logic, but no transformational logic” (Ruggie 
1983: 285). Accordingly, in Waltz’s model, continuity is a product of premise, even 
before it is hypothesized as an outcome (Ruggie 1983: 285). Susan Strange levels the 
same criticism against Krasner. “Krasner’s realist model seem to him, … as it still does 
to Ken Waltz, no different than that of Machiavelli’s time” (Strange 1994: 210), as if the 
modern state system is “based on some timeless principle” (Biersteker and Weber 1996: 
3), because Krasner starts “from the assumption that the basic structure of the 
international system does not change” (Strange 1994: 212). In the same way, Krasner’s 
discussion of state sovereignty seems to assume, though not explicitly, that norms and 
rules of state sovereignty have not been changed, when he says that the principle of state 
sovereignty persisted for a long time even up to now (Krasner 1996: 144) and violations 
and persistence of the principle of state sovereignty have been enduring characteristics 
of international relations (Krasner 1996: 147).  
On the contrary, many others including Smith argue that norms and rules of 
state sovereignty have been changed and transformed, and still continue to be changed 
and transformed. For example, Biersteker and Weber see sovereignty as “constantly 
undergoing change and transformation” (Biersteker and Weber 1996: 11). In principle, 
the constructivist view presupposes that any social construct such as sovereignty can be 
changed, because they are constituted by social practice. Thus, the transformation of 
sovereignty is quite natural according to their assumption. Similarly, norms and rules of 
sovereignty can be changed over time. Not only globalization, but anything can cause it, 
in principle. At the same time, however, norms and rules, in whatever way they are 
formed and maintained, or changed and transformed, must be valid, or must be regarded 
as valid, for some time at least, as long as they are norms and rules at all. Norms and 
rules cannot be changed in a day or in a year. But how long should they be valid? Of 
course not permanently, because they can in principle be changed. Anyway, according 
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to constructivism, norms and rules change, or are “constantly undergoing change and 
transformation” (Biersteker and Weber 1996: 11), but remain valid for some time, that is, 
shape and constrain behavior for some length of time. How can we solve this dilemma 
between change and duration? Smith ignores this dilemma while Krasner proposes a 
solution by “organized hypocrisy.”  
While admitting the enduring importance of sovereignty, Smith argues that it 
has been transformed. In other words, though it has been changing almost by its very 
nature as a social construct, its name and importance, sovereignty in this case, still 
remains. This argument of Smith reminds us of Murray Edelman’s argument about legal 
language. Edelman argues that, in American politics, the legal language is “in fact 
almost completely ambiguous in meaning,” that is, admits of almost any interpretation, 
and thus “administrators and judges do different and even contradictory things which 
ostensibly carrying out the same legal directive” (Edelman 1964: 139).  
Both Krasner and Smith agree upon the enduring importance of state 
sovereignty. But, Krasner regards norms and rules rather unchanged though they are 
often stretched, extended, or simply ignored, while Smith regards them as ever changing, 
over a long time at least. Then, does the issue boil down to whether the norms and rules 
of state sovereignty are changing or they are observed in some cases and violated in 
others? Are they just trying to understand and explain the same phenomenon from 
different viewpoints? Or do we need a much more rigorous examination of the past and 
the present, as Stanley Hoffman suggests? 
 
… we are tempted to exaggerate either continuity with a past that we know badly, or the 
radical originality of the present, depending on whether we are more stuck by the features we 
deem permanent, or with those we do not believe existed before. And yet a more rigorous 
examination of the past might reveal that what we sense as new really is not, and that some 
of the “traditional” features are far more complex than we think (Hoffmann 1977: 57). 
 
Figure 1 is an illustrative attempt at answering this question. Actually, there are 
three figures. The first figure shows in terms of diamonds the facts or realities of the 
practices of the norms and rules of sovereignty. Needless to say, they are actually not 
facts, but perceptions, representations or interpretations of some action by state(s), but 
let us for the time being suppose that they are. The vertical axis indicates the degree to 
which the rules and norms of sovereignty are observed or violated. The horizontal axis 
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indicates the passage of time, say, since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Now, suppose 
that the first figure represents the indisputable “facts.” Given these facts or realities 
shown in the first figure, there are at least two plausible interpretations possible. The 
first is represented by Krasner and the second by transformationalists and/or 
constructivists like Smith. 
In the first interpretation given in the second figure, the principles of  
sovereignty are regarded as (or assumed to be) unchanged. They are held constant, 
despite frequent deviant practices. The horizontal dotted line stands for this assumption. 
To borrow Kransner’s words, the line stands for “a reference point” or “a convention” 
(Krasner 1996: 150). In this interpretation, each practice not faithfully observing the 
principles of sovereignty is considered to be a “variation” around the norm. Krasner’s 
frequent use of “variation” confirms this interpretation, and the term reminds us of the 
statistical “deviation,” which is the difference from the mean (average). As we saw, 
Krasner tries to explain these deviations in terms of “organized hypocrisy.” 
In contrast, in the second interpretation illustrated in the third figure, the 
principles of sovereignty are seen as changing, perhaps as the distribution of actual 
practices show. Though we can employ a non- linear notation, suppose, for the sake of 
simplicity, that the oblique dotted line stands for the change. To repeat a statistical 
metaphor, a simple regression analysis may result in such a line, judging from the 
distribution of actual practices given in the figure. This interpretation seems closer to 
the facts. And it “would allow a richer analysis of the changing nature of sovereignty 
over time” (Biersteker and Weber 1996: 6). 
Incidentally, it is on this ground that constructivists may throw the words of 
“hegemonic discourse” at Krasner ’s interpretation, accusing him of perpetuating the 
status quo. But, as Nicholas Onuf suggests (Onuf 2001: 245), a hegemonic discourse 
will carry the day by definition, for some time at least . 
Now, which of the two interpretations should we choose, Krasner’s or Smith’s? 
Or should we provide a third, more convincing one? We will try to answer this question 
below. 
 
4 Beyond State-centrism 
 
The next issue we would like to take up is the issue of the state-centered assumption of 
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the mainstream international relations theory. By mainstream theory, I mean both 
neorealism and neoliberalism, because, as, for example, Grieco (1988: 494, 503) shows, 
they now share core assumptions which are state-centered. The mainstream model of 
international politics have been repeatedly accused of this “state-centeredness.” Here, I 
will examine Helen Milner ’s proposal for the extension of the state-centered model, and 
explore the theoretical implications of such an extension of the model. As Grieco and 
Milner (and of course, many others) correctly point out, the mainstream model is doubly 
state-centered. First, the mainstream model assumes that states are unitary, as it were, 
monolithic, actors. The result is the neglect of domestic politics or the important 
domestic actors such as the executive, the legislature, the military, bureaucracies, 
political parties, interest groups and so on, which can seriously affect state behavior. It 
is not because (neo)realists deny that domestic politics influences external state 
behavior (Zakaria 1992: 190, 197), but because they assume that “the pressures of 
[external] competition weigh more heavily than ideological preferences or internal 
political pressures” (Waltz 1986: 329). Secondly, another central assumption of the 
mainstream is that states are the most important, if not the sole, actors of consequence in 
international politics. Thus, the mainstream model has ignored the roles of 
multinationals, international organizations and so on. For the better understanding of the 
major issues in international politics such as the likelihood of war, the possibility of 
cooperation and conflict among states, Milner argues for the relaxation of the two 
state-centric assumptions to include both domestic actors and transnational / 
supranational actors (Milner 1998: 759-761). It means the endogenization of domestic 
politics and international organizations, and a departure from blackboxing them (Milner 
1998: 769). Frequently, critics of the mainstream theory either reverse its logic and 
assert the primacy of domestic politics in international relations, or attempt at the 
inclusion of domestic politics and end up with the same assertion (Zakaria 1992: 180, 
192-193). Milner’s is, however, not a proposal for reversal, but for the inclusion of 
domestic politics. 
The proposal can be schematically shown as in Figure 2. The horizontal axis 
shows the relaxation or broadening of the unitary actor assumption, while the vertical 
axis shows the relaxation or broadening of the major actor assumption. The shaded 
rectangle represents the area in which the two core assumptions of the mainstream 
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model, that is, major actor and unitary actor assumptions, hold. As we saw, Milner 
argues that the mainstream model be extended both in vertical and horizontal directions 
to include supranational / transnational actors and domestic actors. In terms of actors, 
Milner disaggregates state actors into domestic actors and aggregates preferences (or, 
goals, interests, etc) of domestic actors to national ones, that is, those of state actors. At 
the same time, she aggregates state actors to supranational (more precisely suprastate) 
actors and disaggregates preferences of suprastate actors into those of state actors. 
Though Milner makes no explicit mention, both processes are involved in the case of 
transnational or transstate actors. From this description, it may seem as if Milner placed 
the same emphasis on domestic actors and transnational / supranational actors. Actually, 
however, she places much greater emphasis upon the relaxation of the “state as an 
unitary actor” assumption, upon “[b]ringing domestic politics back in” (Milner 1998: 
785) to the international relations studies.  
The proposal of the inclusion of actors both internal and external to the state is 
not new. The assertions of the importance of domestic politics in international relations 
are rather commonplace (Rosecrance and Stein 1993: 4-5, Zakaria 1992: 177). But 
Milner goes one step further than that. She attempts to construct an international 
relations theory which explicitly contains both domestic and supranational/transnational 
actors, if not at “[combining] domestic and international politics in one theory” or at 
“[figuring] out a way to unite them” (Waltz 1986: 340). She tries to achieve this, by 
providing a mechanism of aggregation of preferences of actors (Milner 1998: 770). 
Unless we are equipped with some theory which can explain how diverse preferences of 
domestic actors are aggregated into a national one, or more generally how diverse 
preferences of individual actors are aggregated into a collective outcome, then we will 
be left only with hopelessly diverse actors in addition to states, in understanding 
international politics. As this is not the place to discuss the mechanism itself, we will 
not go into the details of Milner ’s discussion in this respect.5 Here let it suffice to 
conclude that Milner tries to establish a way of understanding the mechanism of 
aggregating individual preferences into a collective one. 
 
Conclusion: Level of Abstraction 
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So far, we have briefly sketched two different alternatives to the mainstream model: one 
in the form of a criticism and the other in the form of a proposal of theory extension. 
The alternatives seem to promise a richer and deeper understanding of realities of 
international politics than the mainstream model. Here, however, we should be aware of 
a serious trade-off between theoretical parsimony and descriptive or explanatory 
richness. Of course, parsimony should not be evaluated only by the simplicity of a 
theory but also by its explanatory power (Milner 1998: 770). We cannot naively say that 
the simpler, the better. As Waltz argues, a simple general theory never tells us “all that 
we want to know,” but it tells us instead “a small number of big and important things.” 
And “if we add more variables, the explanatory system becomes more complicated, ... 
theoretical acuity gives way to rich and dense description” (Waltz 1986: 329-330). Or 
following Keohane, “[the] larger the domain of a theory, the less accuracy of detail we 
expect” (Keohane 1986: 187). Simplicity or generality is often attained at the expense 
of descriptive richness. And the latter is often attained at the expense of the former. 
Generally speaking, if we add one variable or factor, we can attain a richer research 
result, as long as the selection of the variable or factor is appropriate. An addition of 
social construction would surely add to a richer analysis of state sovereignty, as 
Biersteker and Weber (1996: 6) advocates. And an addition of a domestic variable or 
two will contribute to a richer understanding of international relations.6 But we lose 
some of the simplicity by the addition of a new variable or factor. On the other hand, the 
deletion of a variable or factor may result in greater simplicity or rigor at the expense of 
descriptive or explanatory power. Of course, we can knowingly say that both are needed 
by each other in a theory of international relations.7 But, such an assertion does not tell 
us how to decide the balance between the two, theoretical parsimony and descriptive 
richness. How should we reconcile the two? Do we have any criterion for the balancing 
of the two? 
Obviously, Keohane’s proposal for “stages” or “multidimensional” theoretical 
framework (Keohane 1985: 188, 190) will be much more fruitful than some kind of 
balance between ,or unification of, theoretical parsimony and descriptive richness in a 
single theory. Keohane introduces the concept of “issue-areas,” and proposes that 
research should proceed from a general theory to more detailed studies of issue-areas: 
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The domain of theory is narrowed to achieve greater precision....We should seek parsimony 
first, then add complexity....To introduce greater complexity into an initially spare theoretical 
structure, the conception of issue-area, ..., is a useful device....Initial explanations should 
seek to account for the main feature of behavior at a high level of aggregation – such as the 
international system as a whole – while subsequent hypotheses are designed to apply only to 
certain issue-areas. (Keohane 1986: 188) 
 
Keohane divides the international system into issue-areas. In the same way, we 
can divide the world into “postmodern, modern and premodern” states (Buzan 1998: 
218, 221) because state relations are quite different both within the groups and between 
the groups. We can think of many such subsystem divisions as core, semiperiphery and 
periphery, or democracies and autocracies, or zone of peace and zone of conflict, and so 
on. These proposals can be seen as attempts at subsystemic theories of lesser abstraction 
or aggregation with narrow scopes, instead of the one imposing a single, global theory. 
On the contrary, Milner proposes a single theory which can deal with domestic politics, 
as we saw above. Keohane’s is a proposal of the division of the field, while Milner’s is a 
proposal of extension. But both involve the issue of the level of aggregation or 
abstraction. We will take it up shortly below.  
The issues of change versus continuity, inclusion versus exclusion of actors, 
and division into subsystems boil down to the issue of abstraction or aggregation in 
international relations theory. Accordingly, to assume, for the time at least, that states 
are unitary and major actors in international politics, by exogenizing important 
non-state actors, is a necessary step toward a theory of international politics at the most 
abstract level. In the same way, to treat interests and identities, or preferences, of states 
as externally given or constant is another. Or to keep the norms and rules, or the idea or 
concept, constant and invariant, or as “given, fixed, or immutable” (Biersteker and 
Weber 1996: 11), as Krasner does, is among similar necessary steps for a theory with a 
high level of abstraction. The mainstream theory abstracts away with such details as 
history or historical change and domestic politics for this purpose (Waltz 1986: 330, 
340). True, as anyone admits, the mainstream model is quite defective and inadequate in 
this sense. It is surely worth the blame of “poverty.” It is because “[the model’s] attempt 
at laying the groundwork for theory is conceptually so rigorous as to leave out much of 
reality [Waltz] wants to account for ... [but] if it is so removed that what it “explains” 
has little relation to what occurs, what is the use?” (Hoffmann 1977: 52) It is also static, 
devoid of change, and hence ahistorical. Whether its current level of abstraction is both 
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necessary and sufficient is yet to be determined, but the mainstream model can (and 
perhaps should) be defended and justified only on this very ground.  
On the contrary, those critical of the model are not entirely free from the 
criticisms of their own making. Let us first take up the unitary actor assumption. In 
Milner ’s argument, domestic actors are assumed to be unitary. In fact, however, many 
domestic actors are notoriously not unitary. It is well known that the military, political 
parties, bureaucracies have their own factions. Logically, therefore, further aggregation 
and disaggregation of domestic actors into their constituent actors such as army, navy, 
air force etc may seem in order. But, Milner will refuse to do so on the ground of the 
theme of international politics and in term of two criteria: generalizability and 
coherence of a collectivity or an actor (Milner 1998: 770). Similarly, constructivists also 
seem to assume that the identity or interest of a state is single or unitary at a particular 
occasion or time, in whatever way it is constituted, and no matter how much it changes 
over time. They never assert that a state in particular or an actor in general, has multiple 
identities or interests at a single moment. They don’t explain why states cannot be a 
Janus or a Doppelgänger. It may be because they think it advisable to assume that the 
state is unitary in this sense for a reasonably short period of time. If so, the issue will be 
that of assumption about the level of abstraction, while they are not as explicit as Waltz 
(1986: 338-339). Milner seems more sensitive to this issue. Though not positively, she 
admits the possibility that state is unitary ex post (Milner 1998: 769).8 But, Milner 
usually precludes the possibility that diverse preferences are aggregated, not into a 
single outcome, but into multiple outcomes at a state or national level. The frequent use 
of the singular “collective outcome” suggests this. Milner assumes that the aggregation 
of diverse preferences result in a single preference as an outcome, say, a single national 
interest. But she doesn’t explain why the aggregation of preferences of domestic actors 
does not result in multiple preferences or outcomes. Probably Milner will defend her 
position on the ground that an actor should be coherent (Milner 1998: 770). Anyway, if 
the state can be viewed as unitary in this sense, why cannot we assume that the state is 
unitary for a certain length of time, for a longer time than critics of the mainstream 
theory implicitly assume? Can not we reduce the differences or debates to the difference 
in (the assumption of a) time frame? And, of course, if states are not seen as unitary at 
any time, they will not be appropriate units of analysis of international politics in the 
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first place. 
The issue brings us (in a sense, back) to the second issue: the issue of change 
versus continuity. As we saw above, whether the international system or the norms and 
rules change or not depends upon the time frame among other things. The examination 
of the criticisms raised against the mainstream model has brought up the issue, but the 
critics themselves do not seem to be aware of this, and they do not offer any clear 
alternative time frame which can be substituted for that of the mainstream model. 
Moreover, the suitable time frame for a particular research varies depending on research 
agendas. Thus, we must yet to decide which time frame is suitable for what research 
purpose. Debates about this issue will be more fruitful than those about the change or 
continuity in an unspecified time frame. More importantly, the suitable (that is, 
necessary and sufficient) level of abstraction or aggregation for a particular research 
depends crucially on research agendas. We must yet to decide which level of abstraction 
is suitable for what research purpose. The issue should be at the core of the debates on 





１ Some argue that the Treaty only established a territorial state, but not a modern state, and hence 
not the modern state system (Litfin 2000: 121). Krasner argues that the explicit articulation of the 
principle of sovereignty had to wait until the late eighteenth century (Krasner 2001c: 177) 
Whether it was a real beginning or not, the Peace of Westphalia has been regarded as a convenient 
label standing for the beginning of the modern state system. 
２ Today, everyone seems to speak of the dec line of sovereignty in every thing he or she is interested 
in. For example, the legal or illegal proliferation of small arms is alleged to cause the decline of 
state sovereignty. Karp suggests that state sovereignty declined, since “[t]he small arms issues are 
motivated mostly by humanitarian considerations, considerations which often pit people against 
their governments. ... [and i]t represents a shift in global priorities, from Westphalian to post 
modern goals, from threats to states to dangers to individuals, from arms control measures 
intended to assure the security of states to measures intended to alleviate human sufferings” (Karp 
2001: 122). But in other places Karp emphasizes the role of governments, because “there are no 
serious barriers ... to legal transfers [of small weapons] and hence “the biggest and most 
destabilizing flows of small arms often come straight from governments” (Karp 2001: 126). This 
is Karp’s answer to the question “Who are the Culprits?” (Karp 2001: 125). Of course, the decline 
of state sovereignty and the increased importance of state governments in small weapons transfers 
may not necessarily contradict with each other. But this example shows us that we should be very 
careful in following the current vogue of “the decline of sovereignty.” 
3 Strange writes; “To argue, as I do, that structural change in production especially, but also in 
finance, is changing the nature of the relation between states, is not to say that states are obsolete, 
or that multinationals are replacing them” (Strange 1994: 212). 
4 Richard Ashley, for example, includes Krasner among the proponents of “neorealism” together 
with Kenneth Waltz, Robert Keohane, Robert Gilpin and others, in his criticism of the North 
American mainstream (Ashley 1984: 227). 
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5 Milner proposes a “rationalist institutionalist” approach as a framework to explain the aggregation 
of preferences into a collective outcome, that is, a collective preference like national interest. 
Milner starts from the characterization of domestic and international politics as polyarchy. 
Anarchy and hierarchy are the opposite ends of a continuum showing the possible distributions of 
power among actors. Polyarchy lies in between the poles of anarchy and hierarchy. In hierarchy, 
power is centralized and monopolized by one actor while in anarchy power is shared completely 
equally among actors as in the free market. In polyarchy, power is shared unequally among actors. 
(Milner 1998: 774). In this situation of polyarchy similar to that of oligopolitic market, interaction 
between actors should necessarily be strategic, in the sense that an actor’s optimal strategy 
depends upon what others do, as in games (Milner 1998: 771). In addition, institutions act to 
aggregate diverse preferences into a collective outcome, and every institution has such 
aggregating mechanisms (Milner 1998: 780). Thus, the rationalist institutionalist model can 
provide a way to understand how diverse preferences are formed into a collective outcome 
(Milner 1998: 780). Milner adds that “this understanding should be combined with a similar 
understanding on the international level” (Milner 1998: 785) and that “rational institutionalism 
can be useful at the international level” (Milner 1998: 778). 
6 Of course, in each of these cases, we should ask how much is explained by the addition, say, of 
domestic variables as opposed to systemic ones which are already included (Zakaria 1992: 184, 
198). And, in asking such a question, we may have to distinguish between the intentions or 
attempts of state actors and the international outcomes of their behavior, as Zakaria (1992: 185) 
suggests. 
7 Here, we are not referring to research agendas of individuals or groups of scholars, but adequate 
components of a theory. For individuals or groups of scholars, “it is hard to be on both at once” 
(Hoffmann 1977: 53). 
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Figure 1 Fact or Interpretation? 
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Principles are held unchanged. 
Each practice is seen as a 
variation from the norm. 
Principles are 
changing 
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Figure 2 Helen Milner’s Proposal for the Extension of the Mainstream Model of International Politics 
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